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LAW & ENTREPRENEURSHIP: Do COURTS
MATTER?
D.

GORDON SMITH*

& MASAKO UEDA**

In this essay, we sketch the outlines of a research agenda
exploring links between courts and entrepreneurship. Our
conception of "law and entrepreneurship" encompasses
the study of positive law (including constitutions, statutes,
and regulations), common law doctrines, and private
ordering that relate to "the discovery and exploitation of

profitable opportunities" by new firms.
We briefly survey the economics literatures that relate to
law and entrepreneurship, including the "law and
finance" literature launched by the work of Rafael La

Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and
Robert Vishny ("LLSV"). Relying on the suggestive work
of LLSV and other economists who have labored over the
connections between entrepreneurshipand law, we suspect
that courts may play an important role in facilitating or
hindering entrepreneurialactivity.
We are particularlyinterested in the possibility that courts
may facilitate the evolution of legal rules to address novel
issues raised by entrepreneurialfirms. This "adaptability
hypothesis " may be subject to empirical testing, thus
shedding light on the otherwise perplexing divide between
common law and civil law countries identified by LLSV
The motivation for such a test lies in the conjecture that
common law countries update their laws more frequently
Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School.
Assistant Professor of Finance, University of Wisconsin-Madison School of
Business. The authors are affiliated with the Initiative for Studies in Technology
Entrepreneurship (INSITE) at the University of Wisconsin. Early versions of this paper
were presented as the Corporate Law Scholar in Residence Lecture at Widener
University School of Law; at the Technology Transfer Society 2005 Annual Conference
in Kansas City, Missouri; at "Location, Luck, or the Law: Why Do Some Venture
Capital Communities Flourish?," the Entrepreneurial Business Law Journal Symposium
at The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law; and at the University of
Wisconsin Law School Faculty Colloquium. Special thanks to Jon Eckhardt, John
Ohnesorge, and Danny Sokol for helpful comments and to Justin Wallace for research
assistance.
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than civil law countries through judicial intervention.
Adaptability in this sense is said to encourage
entrepreneurship because outmoded laws allow for
opportunism, thus discouraging capital formation. The
adaptabilityhypothesis implies thatjudges in common law
systems have more room to maneuver than judges in civil
law systems, and we describe the method by which we
intend to approach ourfuture study of adaptability.
Joseph Schumpeter famously identified the "process of Creative
Destruction" as the "essential fact about capitalism."'
In Schumpeter's
2
view, the entrepreneur
is the agent of creative destruction,3 and the4
novelty.
is
activity
of entrepreneurial
attribute
distinguishing
Entrepreneurs create new products, improve the manufacture of existing
products with new methods, exploit new sources of supply, and develop
new forms of organization. 5
According to Schumpeter, entrepreneurial activity "constitutes a
distinct economic function" because its very novelty ensures that it
transcends the present body of understanding and because society resists
novelty, thus requiring of the entrepreneur the distinctive skill of "getting
IJOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER,

CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 83 (5th

ed. 1976)

[hereinafter SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM]. Schumpeter developed the underlying concept

in his Theory of Economic Development, where he referred to the "new combination of
means of production" as the "fundamental phenomenon of economic development."
JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: AN INQUIRY INTO
PROFITS, CAPITAL, CREDIT, INTEREST, AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE 74 (Redvers Opie

trans., 3d prtg., Harvard Univ. Press 1949) (1934) [hereinafter SCHUMPETER, THEORY].
2 The word "entrepreneur" is derived from the French word entreprendre, which means
"to undertake." An entrepreneur, therefore, connotes "one who undertakes."
Schumpeter's German word for entrepreneurship was "Unternehmergeist," which is
literally translated as "spirit of the undertaker."
On the possible origins of Schumpeter's innovator, see Erich W. Streissler,
The Influence of German andAustrian Economics on Joseph A. Schumpeter, in
SCHUMPETER IN THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 13-38 (Yuichi Shionoya & Mark Perlman eds.,

1994) (tracing Schumpeter's entrepreneur to the writings of various German
economists); Nicholas W. Balabkins, Adaptation Without Attribution? The Genesis of
Schumpeter's Innovator, in JOSEPH ALOIS SCHUMPETER: ENTREPRENEURSHIP, STYLE

AND VISION 203 (Jitrgen Backhaus ed. 2003) (arguing that Schumpeter's entrepreneur
bears a striking resemblance to the entrepreneur in the work of German economist
Albert E. F. Schliffle).
3 SCHUMPETER, THEORY, supra note 1, at 74 ("The carrying out of new combinations
we call 'enterprise'; the individuals whose function it is to carry them out we call
'entrepreneurs."').
4See id at 76 (distinguishing Say's definition of "entrepreneurship," which focuses on
the combination of factors of production, on the ground that "this is a performance of a
special kind only when the factors are combined for the first time while it is merely
routine work if done in the course of running a business").
5 SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, supra note 1, at 132.
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things done.",6 Schumpeter's prediction that entrepreneurs would become
obsolete seems pass in the wake of the revolutionary technological
developments of the past few decades,7 but getting novel things done
remains at the heart of modern conceptions of the entrepreneurial process. 8
Though entrepreneurship as a distinct field of research is still
searching for an identity, 9 entrepreneurship scholars gradually are forging a
consensus about the core commitments of the field. In describing the
entrepreneurial process, for example, scholars typically focus on "the
discovery and exploitation of profitable opportunities."' 0
Novelty is
inherent in such opportunities."

6 Id. Schumpeter wrote:

To undertake such new things is difficult and constitutes a distinct

economic function, first, because they lie outside of the routine tasks
which everybody understands and, secondly, because the
environment resists in many ways that vary, according to social
conditions, from simple refusal either to finance or to buy a new

thing, to physical attack on the man who tries to produce it. To act
with confidence beyond the range of familiar beacons and to
overcome that resistance requires aptitudes that are present in only a
small fraction of the population and that define the entrepreneurial
type as well as the entrepreneurial function. This function does not
essentially consist in either inventing anything or otherwise creating
the conditions which the enterprise exploits. It consists in getting
things done.
Id.
7 Efforts to update Schumpeter in light of modern developments are legion. See, e.g.,
RICHARD R. NELSON & SIDNEY G. WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF ECONOMIC
CHANGE (1982) (describing economic change in terms of evolutionary theory, rather
than Schumpeter's "circular flow").
8 See, e.g., Howard E. Aldrich & C. Marlene Fiol, Fools Rush In? The Institutional
Context of Industry Creation, 19 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 645 (1994) (discussing the
"relative lack of legitimacy" facing innovating entrepreneurs). Entrepreneurship
scholars often emphasize the distinction between "invention" and "entrepreneurship."
Though both are forms of novelty invention involves the creation of something that is
new to the world, whereas entrepreneurshiptypically describes the process of
commercializing a product or service we are concerned only about the latter. For
more on this distinction, see SCHUMPETER, THEORY, supra note 1, at 88-89 (discussing
entrepreneurship as a form of "economic leadership," in which the entrepreneur "'leads'
the means of production into new channels").
9 See Henri A. Schildt et al., Scholarly Communities in EntrepreneurshipResearch: A
Co-Citation Analysis, 30 ENTREPRENEURSHIP THEORY & PRAC. 399 (2006) (concluding

that entrepreneurship research remains "highly fragmented").
10Scott Shane & S. Venkataraman, The Promise of Entrepreneurshipas a Fieldof
Research, 25 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 217 (2000). See also Stanley Kaish & Benjamin
Gilad, Characteristicsof Opportunities Search Of EntrepreneursVersus Executives:
Sources, Interests, GeneralAlertness,6 J. Bus. VENTURING 45 (1991).
1 Jonathan T. Eckhardt & Scott A. Shane, Opportunitiesand Entrepreneurship,29 J.
MGMT. 333, 336 (2003) (defining entrepreneurial opportunities as "situations in which
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In this essay, we are not interested in refining the field of
entrepreneurship per se, but in exploring the derivative discipline, "law and
entrepreneurship.' ', 2 And even in this limited endeavor, we will not attempt
a precise description of the boundaries of "law and entrepreneurship," but
instead content ourselves with a sketch of the field based on our
understanding of entrepreneurship, as described above.
We restrict our attention to "getting novel things done" by new forprofit enterprises. We do not discuss other forms of entrepreneurship, such
as entrepreneurial activities by established firms or by non-profit
organizations.
The former is sometimes called "intrapreneurship. ' ' 3
Scholarly interests in intrapreneurship are clustered around the issue of how
to circumvent organizational inertia in established firms and to get novel
things done, as opposed to conducting routine business. 14 Important issues
in entrepreneurship by new firms arise from lack of experience and
resources, which established firms usually possess. Given these significant
differences between intrapreneurship and entrepreneurship by new firms,
we gain little in the present context from mixing the two forms of
entrepreneurship together.
Non-profit organizations, such as universities, also get novel things
done. For instance, many important scientific discoveries emanate from
university laboratories. Nevertheless, their motives and organization differ
dramatically from for-profit enterprises; therefore, discussion of this form
of entrepreneurship merits independent analysis.
Our conception of "law and entrepreneurship" follows naturally
from the foregoing description of entrepreneurship and encompasses
positive law (including constitutions, statutes, and regulations), common
law doctrines, and private ordering that relate to "the discovery and
exploitation of profitable opportunities" by new firms. While various
disciplines study issues relating to entrepreneurship, such as the
new goods, services, raw materials, markets and organizing methods can be introduced
through the formation of new means, ends, or means-ends relationships").
12Our use of the word "discipline" in connection with "law and entrepreneurship" is
more an act of faith than of descriptive rigor. While we aver that "law and
entrepreneurship" scholarship exists, it has yet to be organized as a discipline. For an
early attempt to define the field, see Steven H. Hobbs, Toward a Theory of Lawl &
Entrepreneurship,26 CAP. U. L. REV. 241, 243 (1997) (focusing on "the study of law as
it affects the entrepreneurial activities of small businesses").
13 GIFFORD PINCHOT, INTRAPRENEURING (1985).
14See, e.g., GLENN R. CARROLL & MICHAEL T. HANNAN, THE DEMOGRAPHY
OF

CORPORATIONS AND INDUSTRIES (2000); Rebecca B. Henderson, Underinvestment and
Incompetence as Responses to Radical Innovation: Evidence From the
PhotolithographicAlignment Equipment Industry, 24 RAND J. ECON. 248 (1993);
Rebecca B. Henderson & Kim B. Clark, Architectural Innovation: The Reconfiguration
of ExistingProduct Technologies and the Failureof EstablishedFirms, 35 ADMIN. SCI.
Q. 9 (1990); Michael Tushman & Philip Anderson, Technological Discontinuitiesand
OrganizationalEnvironments, 31 ADMIN. Sci. Q. 439 (1986).
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characteristics of entrepreneurs5 or the performance of entrepreneurial
firms, 16 law and entrepreneurship studies should focus on the study of the
optimal legal structures that facilitate the commercialization of
entrepreneurial opportunities, as well as the regulation of entrepreneurial
firms. 7
Given the traditional connections between economics and
entrepreneurship studies, it is not surprising that the study of law and
entrepreneurship has flourished among economists. They often focus on
two legal issues that are critical for new firms attempting to get a novel
15 See, e.g., Edward P. Lazear, BalancedSkills And
Entrepreneurship,94 AM. ECON.
REV. 208 (2004); Lowell W. Busenitz & Jay B. Barney, Differences Between
Entrepreneursand Aanagers in Large Organizations:Biases and Heuristics in
StrategicDecision Making, 12 J. Bus. VENTURING 9 (1997); Rita G. McGrath et al.,
Elitists, Risk Takers, and Rugged Individualists? An ExploratoryAnalysis of Cultural
Differences Between Entrepreneursand Non entrepreneurs, 7 J. Bus. VENTURING 115
(1992); David S. Evans & Boyan Jovanovic, An Estimated Model of Entrepreneurial
Choice under Liquidity Constraints, 4 J. POL. ECON. 97 (1989); Thomas M. Begley &
David P. Boyd, Psychological CharacteristicsAssociated With Performance in
EntrepreneurialFirms and Smaller Businesses, 2 J. Bus. VENTURING 79 (1987);
Richard E. Kihlstrom & Jean-Jacques Laffont, A General EquilibriumEntrepreneurial
Theory of Firm FormationBased on Risk Aversion, 87 J. POL. ECON. 719 (1979); David
Robinson and & Manju Pur, Who Are Entrepreneursand Why Do They Behave That
Way?, http://fmg.lse.ac.uk/upload file/751 Purl Manju.pdf (last visited Nov. 20,
2006).
16 Toby E. Stuart et al., Interorganizational
Endorsements and the Performance of
EntrepreneurialVentures, 44 ADMIN. Sci. Q. 315 (1999); Arnold C. Cooper et al.,
InitialHuman and FinancialCapital as Predictors ofNew Venture Performance, 9 J.
Bus. VENTURING 371 (1994); Andrea Larson, Network Dyads In Entrepreneurial
Settings: A Study Of The Governance Of Exchange Relationships, 37 ADMIN. Sci. Q. 76
(1992); Timothy Bates, EntrepreneurHuman CapitalInputs and Small Business
Longevity, 72 REV. ECON. & STAT. 551 (1990); David S. Evans & Linda S. Leighton,
Some EmpiricalAspects of Entrepreneurship,79 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1989); William
R. Sandberg & Charles W. Hofer, Improving New Venture Performance: The Role of
Strategy, Industry Structure, and the Entrepreneur,2 J. Bus. VENTURING 5 (1987).
17

C f BARBARA J. BIRD, ENTREPRENEURIAL BEHAVIOR
3 (1989):

At the most general level, entrepreneurship is the creation of value
through the creation of organization. Entrepreneurs discover, invent,
reveal, enact, and in other ways make manifest some new product,
service, transaction, resource, technology, and/or market that has
value to some community or marketplace ....

[T]he process of

creating value operates through the creation of a multiperson system
(organization) that transforms input such as materials, money, and
time into output such as product and services. Excluded are the
activities of the solely self-interested (the clever thief and the con
artist) and those who create without deliberate and choiceful
organizing of human resources (e.g., artists, inventors, and solo-selfemployed professionals). Included are those who start a business or
nonprofit agency and those who transform (acquire, redirect,
restructure, and "turn around") existing organizations so they add
new values to the community or marketplace.
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thing done. First, such firms are heavily dependent on their novel ideas
because they lack the physical resources possessed by established firms. 8
As a consequence, economists often identify intellectual property protection
as a key driver of entrepreneurship.1 9 Second, pursuing a novel idea often
requires substantial amounts of money that is difficult for new firms to
generate internally.
Investors are willing to finance these firms only if
they feel they are well protected from opportunistic behaviors by firms.21
Therefore, legal protection of investors is considered to be essential for
nurturing entrepreneurship. In what follows, we first briefly review the
economics literature on protection of intellectual property, then turn to the
economics literature on investor protection.
Kenneth Arrow was the first to observe the difficulties faced by
low-resource firms in appropriating returns from their novel ideas when
intellectual property rights are weak.22 Arrow argued that attempting to sell
a novel idea often is unfruitful because sellers can persuade potential buyers
of the value of the idea only by disclosing the contents of the idea. Of
course, potential buyers who acquire information in the course of such
disclosure are unlikely to pay the original owner for the idea. Thus, to fully
appropriate returns to novel ideas, those who generate such ideas may need
to exploit the ideas without selling them to third parties. But exploitation of
novel ideas often requires substantial resources unavailable to new firms.
As a result, Joshua Gans and Scott Stern have argued that new firms benefit
greatly from vigorous protection of intellectual
property, which allows
23
firms to sell their novel ideas profitably.
18 See, e.g, RICHARD L. SMITH & JANET K. SMITH, ENTREPRENEURIAL FINANCE (2d ed.
2003) (illustrating the "S-curve" in new venture creation, showing that a new firm runs
a substantial deficit due to the need to build or acquire physical assets, including office
equipment and plants).

19See, e.g., Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriatingthe Returnsfrom Industrial
Research
and Development, 3 BROOKINGS PAPERS ECON. ACTIVITIES 783 (1987) (finding that

large firms generally rate patents as less effective mechanisms of appropriation than the
other means such as secrecy, lead time, and sales or service efforts, while startups
typically do possess these appropriation vehicles because startups do not own their
manufacturing and marketing capacities). For more on the difference in patent
propensity between established and startup firms, see Wesley M. Cohen et al.,
ProtectingTheir IntellectualAssets: AppropriabilityConditions and Why U S.
ManufacturingFirms Patent (or Not), Table 7 (NBER Working Paper 7552, 2000),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid 214952 (finding that

propensity to patent process innovations is negatively related with the presence of
complementary sales and service assets, which new firms may not be able to afford).
20See SMITH & SMITH, supra note 18.
21 See,

e.g, Simeon Djankov et al., The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. W 11883, 2005).
22 Kenneth Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resourcesfor Invention, in
THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY

(Richard Nelson, ed. 1962).

23Joshua S. Gans & Scott Stern, Incumbency and R&D Incentives: Licensing the Gale
of Creative Destruction, 4 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRAT. 9 (2000).
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Given that firms often disclose their ideas to potential investors, the

problem identified by Arrow may also exist when new firms seek financing,
rather than the sale of their ideas. Recognizing this potential for mischief,
Masako Ueda also argues for vigorous protection of intellectual property
rights.24 If intellectual property laws protect the novel ideas underlying
entrepreneurial firms from expropriation by investors, such laws should

increase financing options, thereby stimulating entrepreneurship.
Despite empirical support for this view,25 some authors emphasize
the negative effects of intellectual property laws on entrepreneurship. For
instance, Joshua Lerner claims, "First, as patents become easier to get, their
value for the truly innovative firms-such as those backed by venture
capitalists-decreases . . . . Second, young firms are frequently targets of
patent litigation [by established firms]. 26 The second point suggests that
stronger protection of intellectual property rights may favor established
firms more than entrepreneurial firms.27
In addition to this ongoing debate about how protection of
intellectual property influences entrepreneurship, economists have
investigated how legal protection of investors affects entrepreneurship.
Combined with the desire to get novel things done, limited internal
financial resources often force entrepreneurial firms to seek outside
financing. Nevertheless, the very novelty of the firm and its entrepreneurial
idea may make it difficult for investors to assess the quality of the
investment opportunity and to monitor the progress of the project once
invested. If unaddressed, this asymmetric information problem would

24 Masako

Ueda, Banks versus Venture Capital: ProjectEvaluation, Screening, and

Expropriation,59 J. FIN. 601 (2004).
25For

evidence supporting the role of patents in stimulating entrepreneurship, see

Joshua S. Gans et al., When Does Start-Up Innovation Spur the Gale of Creative

Destruction?, 33

RAND

J. ECON. 571 (2002) (finding that start-up firms with patents,

which are less likely subject to the appropriation problem, choose to commercialize
through cooperation from established firms such as licensing); Bronwyn H. Hall &
Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis, The PatentParadoxRevisited. An EmpiricalStudy Of
Patenting In The US Semiconductor Industry, 1979-1995, 32 RAND J. ECON. 101 (2001)
(finding that the strengthening of US patent rights in the 1980s may have facilitated
entry by specialized design firms during this period).
26 Ann Cullen, The U.S. Patent Game. Hiow to Change It. Q&A
with Josh Lerner, HBS
WORKING KNOWLEDGE, Dec. 20, 2004, available at
http://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/4548.html. See also, Joshua Lerner, The Importance of
Patent Scope: An EmpiricalAnalysis, 25 RAND J. ECON. 319 (1994) (showing that
patents with broader scope are associated with higher valuations of the firms, indicating
that stronger protection of patent benefit VC-backed firms).
27 Related to this point, Ronald Gilson hypothesizes that enforcement of non-compete
clauses in Massachusetts impaired the development of the Route 128 technology cluster
as compared to Silicon Valley. Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High
Technology IndustrialDistricts:Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to
Compete., 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575 (1999).
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2
create plenty of chances for entrepreneurs to act opportunistically.
Foreseeing these potential pitfalls, outside investors would not provide the
entrepreneurial firms with funds in the first place. Economists have argued
that well-designed laws that protect investors may overcome this potential
for underinvestment. This line of reasoning was initiated by a literature
called "law and finance."
In a series of articles beginning in 1997, Rafael La Porta, Florencio
Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny ("LLSV") created a
sensation among legal academics by proposing that "countries with poorer
investor protections, measured by both the character of legal rules and the
quality of law enforcement, have smaller and narrower capital markets. 2 9
LLSV's argument began with this question: "Why do some countries have
so much bigger capital markets than others? '30 That some countries have
much bigger capital markets than others is uncontested. These large-market
countries have more initial public offerings than other countries, and their
corporations display dispersed ownership patterns indicative of the
separation of ownership and control that has long dominated American
corporate governance. Moreover, there is a high correlation between
countries with these indicia of advanced financial development and
countries with a legal system based on common law.3'
The initial work of LLSV faced two major conceptual hurdles.
First, LLSV observed a correlation between economic development and the
common law tradition, but this merely prompted the question, "What is it
about the common law, if anything, that fosters financial development?"
Law professors have been extremely skeptical of a causal relation between
the common law and financial development,32 but economists have made
several attempts to address this issue. One hypothesis is that law is more
8

28See, e.g., Charles P Himmelberg & Bruce C. Petersen, R&D andInternal Finance:A
PanelStudy of Small Firms in High-Tech Industries, 76 REV. ECON. & STAT. 38 (1994).
29Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131

(1997) [hereinafter Legal Determinants];Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106
J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998) [hereinafter Lav and Finance];Rafael La Porta et al.,
Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471 (1999) [hereinafter Corporate

Owinership].
30Legal Determinants,supra note 29, at 1131.
31ASLI DEMIRGUC-KUNT & Ross LEVINE, FINANCIAL STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC
GROWTH: A CROSS-COUNTRY COMPARISON OF BANKS, MARKETS, AND DEVELOPMENT

(2001).

32 See, e.g, MARK J. ROE, POLITICAL DETERMINANT OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:

POLITICAL CONTEXT, CORPORATE IMPACT (2003); Holger Spamann, On the
Insignificance and or Endogeneity qf La Porta et al. 's 'Anti-DirectorRights Index'

under ConsistentCoding (Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center, Discussion Paper
No. 7, 2006). For a humorous spoofofLLSV, see Mark D. West, Legal Determinants
of World Cup Success (Univ. of Mich., John M. Olin Center for Law & Econ., Working

Paper No. 02-009, 2002) (finding a correlation between legal protections and soccer
success).
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effectively enforced in common law countries than in civil law countries. 3
Simeon Djankov and three of the LLSV authors found that judicial
procedures often are more complex and slower in civil law countries than in
common law countries, suggesting that contracts in civil law countries may
not be litigated to the same extent as in common law countries.34 More
recently, the same authors have argued that restrictions on self-dealing often
seen in common law countries are responsible for larger financial markets
in those countries .
The second conceptual hurdle faced by LLSV was the notion that
external investors actually relied on legal protections offered by the state.
LLSV did not consider the possibility that external investors could
compensate for gaps in legal protections via contract. The possibility of
contracting creates two potential problems for LLSV: (1) parties in lowprotection legal environments might contract for more protection; and (2)
parties in a high-protection legal environment might contract out of certain
protective provisions.
Investigating this issue in the context of venture capital contracting,
some economists have found that contracts are substitutes for poor legal
protections. For example, Steven Kaplan et al. studied the investment
performance of venture capitalists in twenty-three countries outside of the
United States and found that the legal origin of the host country (civil law
versus common law) was not correlated with investment performance after
controlling for characteristics of contracts. 36 Accordingly, they concluded
that "legal origins do not matter" but contracts do.37 Joshua Lerner and
Antoinette Schoar analyzed 210 private equity investments in developing
countries and found that private equity investors in civil law countries relied
more on equity and board control than private equity investors in common
law countries, suggesting that contractual provisions are substitutes for
legal protection offered by the states. 38 Despite concluding that contracts
and positive laws may be substitutes, Lerner and Schoar also found that
investment performance of private equity investment was better in common
law countries than in civil law countries; therefore, their findings are
consistent with the view that "legal origins matter." Finally, Mihir Desai et
33For instance, a Nobel Prize Laureate Douglass North has argued, "how effectively

agreements are enforced is the single most important determinant of economic
performance." DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990).
34 Simeon Djankov et al., Courts,

118 Q. J. EcoN. 453 (2003).
3' Djankov et al., supra note 21.
36 Steven N Kaplan et al., Hiow Do Legal Differences and LearningAffect
Financial
Contracts? (Working Paper, 2003), availableat http://ssrn.com/abstract-557007.
37 Id. Interestingly, they find that venture capitalists that adopt U.S.-style contracts are
less likely to fail.
38 Josh Lerner & Antoinette Schoar, Does Legal Enforcement Affect
Financial
Transactions?: The ContractualChannel in Private Equity, 120 Q. J. ECON. 223

(2005).
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al. found that in less developed countries, legal environments are important
for the availability of external finance and thereby conductive to the healthy
development of entrepreneurial activities. 31
Parallel with the law and finance literature, many economists have
studied contracting problems between an entrepreneurial firm and its
external investors. Each of these areas of study highlights a particular issue
that arises from financing a new firm to get novel things done.
First, as we argued above, entrepreneurial firms often are highly
dependent on their novel ideas, and they may have few physical assets. A
large portion of the value of such a firm resides in human capital of the
founders. Unlike physical assets, human capital is difficult for investors in
the firm to possess and control. As a result, investors in entrepreneurial
firms are inherently vulnerable to the threat by the founders to withhold
their human capital from the firms. One solution for this problem is a
bankruptcy law that is tough on debtors.40 Under such a law, the founders
would be heavily penalized for withholding their human capital and
bankrupting the firm. As a result, they might refrain from threatening to
withhold their human capital, and absent such threats, investors would be
more willing to finance firms in the first place. 4'
A large body of literature on venture capital contracting implicitly
assumes that professional venture capitalists (VCs) offer a solution to the
problem of human capital withholding by founders. VCs provide not only
money, but valuable advice and assistance to their portfolio firms.42 Like
founders, VCs can threaten to withhold their valuable human capital, and
this potential threat may counterbalance potential threats by founders.43
This situation is essentially the same as a partnership or a joint
venture in which two parties provide the venture with their human capital as
well as other resources. Relying on this insight, Gilles Chemla et al.
explain commonly observed terms in venture capital contracts and joint
venture agreements.44 Also, using the same framework in a context where
both a founder and a venture capitalist provide human capital, several
39

Mihir Desai et al., Institutions, CapitalConstraints and EntrepreneurialFirm

Dynamics: Evidence from Europe (Harv. Bus. Sch. Negotiation, Org. and Marketing
Unit, Working Paper No. 03-59, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-479982.
40 See,

e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, Ex-Ante Costs of Violating Absolute Priorityin
Bankruptcy, 57 J. FIN. 445 (2002).
41 But see Kenneth Ayotte, Bankruptcy and Entrepreneurship:The Value of a Fresh
Start, 23 J. L. ECON. & ORG. (forthcoming 2007) (arguing that applying absolute
priority in bankruptcy strictly undermines the incentives of the firm to restructure and
therefore may have a negative impact on the post-restructuring performance).
42 See, e.g., Thomas Hellmann & Manju Puni, Venture Capital and the
Professionalizationof Start-up Firms: EmpiricalEvidence, 57 J. FIN. 169 (2002).
43 Yeon-Koo Che & Jozsef Sakovics, A Dynamic Theory of Holdup, 72 ECONOMETRICA

1063 (2004).

44 Gilles Chemla et al., An Analysis qf ShareholderAgreements, J. EuRo. ECON. Assoc.

(forthcoming Mar. 2007).

2006]

DO COURTS MATTER?

studies have offered an explanation for the frequent use of convertible
securities in venture capital contracts.45
Second, novel ideas often fail.46 Founders may resist shutting down
their firms, even when prospects are bleak. As a result, the financing of
entrepreneurial firms typically includes a mechanism to halt excessive
continuation by the founder. Dirk Bergemann and Ulrich Hege 47 argue that
staged financing performs this function, and Thomas Hellmann contends
that shifting control rights from the founder to the financier when the
venture is not progressing well. 48 Gordon Smith discusses both staged
financing and shifting control rights as sources of VC power.49
In addition to the law and finance and contracting literatures
surveyed above, a number of articles stress the importance of welldeveloped stock markets for entrepreneurship. These studies fall into the
category of "law and entrepreneurship," assuming the importance of legal
environment for the development of stock markets, as posited in the law
and finance literature. Two distinctive arguments connect stock markets
and entrepreneurship.
First, several commentators claim that stock markets allow VCs to
exit their investments, recycling their value-added services.5 ° Under this
view, active stock markets not only encourage new firms to go public, but
also enable established public firms to acquire new firms by using stock.
VCs can sell their shares into active stock markets, and in the absence of
such markets, VCs suffer from illiquidity discounts when they attempt to
sell their shares. This illiquidity discount reduces the expected return to

See Catherine Casamatta , Financingand Advising: Optimal FinancialContractswith
Venture Capitalists, 58 J. FIN. 2059 (2003); Georg Nbldeke & Klaus M. Schmidt,
Option Contracts and Renegotiation: A Solution to the Hold-Up Problem, 26 RAND J.
ECON. 163 (1995); Rafael Repullo & Javier Suarez, Venture Capital Finance:A
Security Design Approach, 8 REV. FIN. 75 (2004). For an alternative explanation of
convertible securities, based on taxation, see Ronald J. Gilson & David M. Schizer,
UnderstandingVenture Capital Structure: A Tax Explanation For Convertible
PreferredStock, 116 HARV. L. REV. 874 (2003).
46 See, e.g., Boyan Jovanovic, Selection and Evolution of Industry,
50 ECONOMETRICA
649 (1982) (arguing that a new firm enters a market without knowing its profitability
and learns about it over time).
47 Dirk Bergemann & Ulrich Hege, The Financingof Innovation: Learningand
45

Stopping, 36 RAND J. ECON. 719 (2005).

Thomas Hellmann, The Allocation of Control Rights in Venture CapitalContracts, 29
RAND J. ECON. 57 (1998).
49 D. Gordon Smith, The Exit Structure of Venture Capital, 53 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 315
(2005). See also Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strmberg, FinancialContractingTheory
48

Meets the Real World. An EmpiricalAnalysis of Venture CapitalContracts, 70 REV.

281 (2003).
Bernard S. Black & Ronald J Gilson, Does Venture CapitalRequire an Active Stock
Market?, 11 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 36 (1999); Claudio Michelacci & Javier Suarez,
Business Creation and the Stock Market, 71 REV. ECON. STUD. 459 (2004).
ECON. STUD.
50
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venture capitalists, making them less likely to invest in new firms in the
first place.
Second, a novel idea and the firm that conceives it may initially
have difficulty finding supporters. Such supporters may be more likely to
connect with innovative firms through stock markets, which are populated
by investors of diverse interests. Franklin Allen and Douglas Gale have
stressed this role of stock markets in bridging between entrepreneurial firms
and investors who appreciate and support the firms. 51
As evidenced by the foregoing discussion, entrepreneurship and
law have many potential contact points, but one feature of the legal system
is pervasive: courts. Whether acting as the interpreters of intellectual
property or securities laws, as the architects of judicial doctrines such as
fiduciary duty or the contractual duty of good faith, or as the arbiters of
contract provisions, courts may have an important influence over the level
52
of entrepreneurship in a given region or country.
We are particularly interested in the possibility that courts may
facilitate the evolution of legal rules to address novel issues raised by
entrepreneurial firms. This so-called "adaptability hypothesis" is itself not
novel, 53 but we are intrigued by the possibility that judicial adaptability
might be tested empirically, thus shedding light on the otherwise perplexing
divide between common law and civil law countries. The motivation for
this test lies in the conjecture that common law countries update their laws

51Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, Diversity qf Opinion and Financingof New
Technologies, 8 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 68 (1999).

52 For examples of various ways in which courts might influence level of
entrepreneurship, see Jean 0. Lanjouw & Josh Lerner, Tilting the Table? The Use of
PreliminaryInjunctions, 44 J. L. ECON. 573 (2001) (arguing that cases involving new
technology are often settled in courts due to uncertainty over the judicial outcomes);
Vladimir A. Atanasov et al., VCs and the Expropriationof Entrepreneurs(Working
Paper, 2006), availableat http://ssrn.com/abstract-905923 (showing that VCs who had
been sued by entrepreneurs subsequently raised less capital and participated in fewer
syndicated deals, suggesting that the opportunity to bring complaints to courts may play
a disciplinary role).
53See John K. M. Ohnesorge, China's Economic Transitionandthe New Legal Origins
Literature, 14 CHINA ECON. REV. 485, 489 (2003):
Another familiar leitmotif of the legal origins literature is that
civilian legal regimes are perversely formalistic, and that this is a
problem that reformers of civilian regimes need to overcome. ...
This feeling seems to strike every common lawyer first encountering
a civilian system, as it seems to strike nonlawyers who start looking
closely at any legal system. For example, an attack on civilian
formalism was an important strain in the Law and Development
movement of the 1960s and 1970s, many members of which were
Americans attempting to modernize civilian regimes in the Third
World.
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4
more frequently than civil law countries through judicial intervention.1
Such adaptability is said to encourage entrepreneurship because outmoded
laws allow for opportunism, thus discouraging capital formation. The
adaptability hypothesis implies that judges in common law systems have
more room to maneuver than judges in civil law systems.5
The adaptability hypothesis may appear to produce some tension
with the notion that businesses value "calculability" or predictability. This
idea was important to Max Weber's account of capitalism,1 6 and it arises
among modern legal scholars in various contexts.5 The perceived tension
between these ideas exists only to the extent that one insists on complete
stability or complete adaptability, but realistic accounts of the judicial
process acknowledge both elements. 8

54Thorsten Beck et al., Law and Finance: Why Does Legal Origin Matter?, 31 J. COMP.

653 (2003). The French situation encouraged the development of easily verifiable
"bright-line-rules" that do not rely on the discretion ofjudges. While simple and clear,
some scholars argue that bright-line-rules and excessive judicial formalism may not
allow judges sufficient discretion to apply laws fairly to changing conditions and
therefore not support evolving commercial needs. Simon Johnson et al., Property
Rights and Finance,92 AMER. ECON. REV. 1335 (2002). In contrast to the French civil
law, the English common law tradition is almost synonymous with judges having broad
interpretation powers and with courts molding and creating law as circumstances
change.
55 H. PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD 136 (2d ed. 2004).
Glenn
ECON.

describes this notion as follows:
If everyone has pre-defined rights (which do not in any way depend
on judicial determination), then their violation may exist prior to
judgment, and the judicial function is largely one of verification of
claims of violation of pre-existing rights, and remedying the
violations.
Id. at 146.
56 1 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY

883 (G. Roth & R. Wittich eds., Ephraim

Fischoffet al. trans., 1968) (1956) ("the increasing calculability of the functioning of
the legal process ... constituted one of the most important conditions for the existence
of... capitalistic enterprise"). For an examination of Weber and the notion of
calculability, see David M. Trubek, Max Weber on Lav and the Rise of Capitalism,
1972 WIS. L. REV. 720, 734-35 (1972).
57See, e.g., Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, The FederalCircuit: A Case Study in Specialized
Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1,7 (1989) (rehearsing arguments in favor of the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, about which proponents claimed, "Greater certainty and
predictability would foster technological growth and industrial innovation and would
facilitate business planning."); Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the
IncorporationPuzzle, I J. L. ECON. & ORG. 225, 274 (1985) (describing a survey in

which corporations that reincorporated in Delaware cited stability and predictability as
advantages).
51See, e.g., Allan C. Hutchinson, Work-In-Progress:Evolution and Common Law, 11
TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 253 (2005) (noting that "the pressing challenge" of the

common law system is "to balance stability and continuity against flexibility and
change such that it results in a state of affairs that is neither only a case of stunted
development nor a case of 'anything goes'?").
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We conceive of the adaptability of courts along two dimensions:
interpretation and innovation.5 9 Interpretation is central to the judicial role.
Indeed, Kathleen Sullivan has observed that law "is a branch of rhetoric that
gives normative force to interpretation and analysis. ' ' 60
Methods of
interpretation may vary depending on the source of law, and theories of
interpretation are legion. 6 1 For purposes of evaluating legal adaptability,
however, we could avoid debates about the relative merits of various
interpretive theories, focusing instead on the expressed interpretive
strategies as applied by courts to claims in litigation. Stated another way,
adaptability is about courts keeping pace with changes incited by
entrepreneurial firms, and we would expect to see some evidence of judicial
adaptability in the pronouncements of judges.
In testing judicial
adaptability, therefore, we would turn to judicial opinions as a source of
data.
In examining the judicial opinions, we would find interpretations of
constitutions, statutes, regulations, other judicial opinions, and contracts.
By coding each interpretive act (say, according to the litigated claims), we
should be able to obtain a measure of adaptability. For purposes of
illustration, we rely here on Eskridge and Frickey's oft-cited article on
statutory interpretation,6 2 which describes three theories of statutory

'9Our discussion here focuses on laws, not facts. We acknowledge the possibility that
courts may adapt to technological or business innovations by creatively framing the
facts underlying the disputes before them, but the adaptability hypothesis does not focus
on this sort of adaptation as a potential source of meaningful differences between
common law and civil law countries.
60Kathleen M. Sullivan, Forward:Interdisciplinarity,100 MICH. L. REV. 1217, 1219
(2002).
61For recent work on constitutional interpretation, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN
ROBES: WHY EXTREME RIGHT-WING COURTS ARE WRONG FOR AMERICA (2005); AKHIL

REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY (2005); JED RUBENFELD,
REVOLUTION BY JUDICIARY: THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(2005); DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY:
THE MISGUIDED QUEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS (2002). Papers from a

recent symposium on "Theories of Statutory Interpretation" were published in 38 LoY.
L.A. L. REV. 1899 et seq. (2005). For an introduction to the voluminous literature on

statutory interpretation, see William N. Eskridge, Jr. et al., LEGISLATION: STATUTES
AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY (2001). For recent work on the common law
method, see STEVEN D. SMITH, LAW'S QUANDARY (2004); Frederick Schauer, Do Cases

Aake Bad Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 883 (2006). For recent work on the interpretation
of contracts, see Steven Shavell, On The Writing And The Interpretation Of Contracts,
22 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 289 (2006); Alan Schwartz, & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory
and the Limits of ContractLaw, 113 YALE L.J.541 (2003); Karen Eggleston et al., The
Design and Interpretationof Contracts: Why Complexity Matters, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 91
(2000).
62William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretationas Practical
Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990).
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interpretation: textualism, intentionalism, and purposivism. We discuss
each theory briefly below.
All sources of law require interpretation. Even when words appear
to have a "plain meaning," that meaning depends on both culture and
context. As Judge Learned Hand famously wrote: "Words are not pebbles
in alien juxtaposition; they have only a communal existence; and not only
does the meaning of each interpenetrate the other, but all in their aggregate
take their purport from the setting in which they are used. ..
3
Nevertheless, many statements of law have meanings about which the legal
community has reached a high level of consensus. Moreover, even in the
absence of consensus, judges frequently assume that the relevant legal
standards have a more-or-less fixed meaning. When judges analyze claims
in this way, they are employing a "textualist" theory of interpretation.6 4
In other circumstances, judges may perceive the need to pursue a
more contextual interpretation. One method of evaluating context is to
examine the history and development of the relevant legal authority. In
some instances, the legal authority was created long before the occurrence
of the dispute, and the text may have developed new and different meanings
during the interim. In any event, historical reference can aid courts in
ascertaining the intention of the lawmaker, whether that is a legislature, a
court, or a private party. When judges analyze claims in this way, they are
employing an "intentionalist" theory of interpretation.
Another contextual approach to interpretation inquires after the
purpose underlying a legal rule. Like appeals to structure, this tool attempts
to acknowledge the hand of the lawmaker, whether that is the legislature, a
prior court, or the contract drafter. Purposes may be discovered or inferred.
When judges analyze claims in this way, they are employing a "purposive"
theory of interpretation.
These various interpretive theories are not mutually exclusive.
Judges often use more than one theory on a legal authority to bolster the
persuasiveness of their chosen interpretation. 6 ' The diversity of interpretive
methods suggests that judges possess substantial discretionary power and
we would expect to observe such discretion in all legal systems. As noted
by Judge Cardozo, "You may call [the judicial] process legislation, if you

63NLRB v. Federbush, Co., 121 F.2d. 954, 957 (2d Cir. 1941).
64See, e.g, ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL

COURTS AND

(1997); John F. Manning, Textualism as a NondelegationDoctrine, 97
COLUM. L. REV. 673 (1997).
65Eskridge and Frickey endorse this more holistic approach to interpretation: "by
bringing all the relevant factors and all of our problem-solving skills to bear on difficult
questions of statutory meaning in concrete situations, practical reasoning legitimates
statutory interpretation through deliberation and candor." Eskridge & Frickey, supra
note 62, at 383.
THE LAW

368

ENTREPRENEURIAL BUSINESS LA W
JOURNAL

[Vol. 1:2

will. In any
event, no system ofjus scriptum has been able to escape the
66
need of it.,
In addition to the interpretive theories just discussed, we
acknowledge the possibility that judges will depart from interpretation and
create new legal rights or obligations. The adaptability hypothesis stresses
the role of common law judges in shaping the evolution of laws in line with
ever-changing business needs and practices, and though common law
judges have substantial discretion, we would expect innovative actions to be
less common than interpretive creativity. Nevertheless, claims based on
doctrines such as common law fraud, fiduciary duty, or the duty of good
faith and fair dealing seem particularly ripe for judicial innovation. Such
doctrines are considered to be an essential vehicle for U.S. law to evolve
quickly according to business needs. 6
Even if courts supplied adaptations to the legal system, there is no
guarantee that the adaptations would be entrepreneurship enhancing.
Whether adaptations aim to enhance entrepreneurship may depend on levels
of judicial independence. Some scholars have suggested that judges in
common law countries are more independent of politics than judges in civil
68
law countries.
Politics often are heavily influenced by established firms,
which tend to discourage the development of financial markets, which in
turn facilitate the entry of new firms and invite competition.
The
implication is that judges in civil law countries may discourage capital
formation.
In the latter part of this essay, we have sketched the outlines of a
research agenda exploring links between courts and entrepreneurship.
Relying on the suggestive work of economists who have labored over the
connections between entrepreneurship and law over the past decade, we
suspect that courts may play an important role in facilitating or hindering
entrepreneurial activity. Of course, speculating about adaptability and
testing the adaptability hypothesis are quite different matters. We recognize
that the methodological challenges inherent in our project are ample, though
we take refuge in the advice of one of our senior colleagues, who observed,
"You can't do this, but you must do this."
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